Abstract-In the secure network coding for multicasting, there is loss of information rate due to inclusion of random bits at the source node. We show a method to eliminate that loss of information rate by using multiple statistically independent messages to be kept secret from an eavesdropper. 
network topology and coding at intermediate nodes, and the computational complexity of code construction is large. In order to remove these drawbacks, Silva and Kschischang [19] proposed the universal weakly secure network coding, in which they showed an efficient code construction that can support up to two F q -symbols in each S i and is independent of the network topology and coding at intermediate nodes. They [19] also showed the existence of universal weakly secure network coding with more than two F q -symbols in S i , but have not shown an explicit construction.
We shall propose a construction of secure multiplex network coding that is an adaptation of Yamamoto et al.'s idea [14] to the network coding. However, we relax an aspect of the security requirements traditionally used in the secure network coding. In previous proposals of secure network coding [4] , [3] , [11] , [19] , [20] it is required that the mutual information to the eavesdropper is exactly zero. We relax this requirement by regarding sufficiently small mutual information to be acceptable. This relaxation is similar to requiring the bit error rate to be sufficiently small instead of strictly zero. Also observe that our relaxed criterion is much stronger than one commonly used in the information theoretic security [16] . Our construction can realize arbitrary small mutual information if coding over sufficiently many time slots is allowed.
There are several reasonable models of the eavesdropper Eve. In the traditional model used in [4] , [5] , [11] , [19] , [20] , Eve can arbitrary choose the set of µ eavesdropped links after learning the structure of network coding and the set of eavesdropped links is assumed to be constant during transmission of one coding block. The secure network coding is required to leak no information with every set of µ eavesdropped links. We call this model as the traditional eavesdropping model. We shall show that the proposed scheme is universal secure in Section III-C in the sense of [19] , [20] under the traditional eavesdropping model. However, it is observed in [18] that there is difficulty in implementation over the current Internet architecture to keep the set of eavesdropped links constant even when the set of eavesdropped links is physically constant. Thus, we consider another model of the eavesdropper in which the set of eavesdropped links is statistically distributed independent of the structure of transmitter, the number of eavesdropped links is µ per unit time, and the set of eavesdropped links is allowed to be time-varying. We call this second model as the statistical eavesdropping model. We shall also show that the mutual information is small averaged over any probability distribution of network coding statistically independent of any other random variables, instead of the mutual information being small with every network coding as done in [4] , [5] , [11] , [19] , [20] . Since the network coding is often constructed in the random manner [13] , considering the probability distribution of network coding and requiring the averaged mutual information being small make sense. We also define a Shannon theoretic capacity region of secure multiplex network coding and show that the proposed construction can achieve that capacity region.
Although Harada and Yamamoto [11] have not explicitly stated, the adaptation of the secure multiplex coding [14] to the secure network coding [4] , [5] can be done by their strongly secure network coding [11] . The difference between our proposed scheme and the previous works [3] , [11] , [19] is as follows:
• The computational complexity of constructing network coding is huge in [3] , [11] , while the computational complexity of code construction in the proposed scheme is that of selecting a random nonsingular linear matrix.
• The construction of network coding in [3] , [11] depends on the underlying network topology, while the proposed scheme is independent of it and universal secure in the sense of [19] , [20] under the traditional eavesdropping model (see Section III-C).
• The explicit construction of universal weakly secure network coding in [19] supports up to two F q -symbols in each secret message S i and guarantees that the mutual information between each S i and Eve's information is zero, while the proposed scheme has no limitation on the size of S i and can make the mutual information between any collection (S i : i ∈ I) and Eve's information arbitrary small 1 provided that the total information rate of (S i : i ∈ I) is not too large relative to µ.
• When the total information rate of (S i : i ∈ I) is large relative to µ, the mutual information to Eve becomes positive, but [3] , [19] do not evaluate how large it is nor their smallest possible value. The proposed scheme realizes asymptotically the smallest possible value of mutual information with every collection (S i : i ∈ I) simultaneously, as well as [11] . This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews related results used in this paper. Section III introduces the strengthened version of the privacy amplification theorem and the proposed scheme for secure network coding, then proves the asymptotic optimality of the latter. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. Preliminary

A. Model of network coding
As in [3] , [4] , [5] , [11] , [19] , [20] we consider the single source multicast. The network model is either acyclic or cyclic, 1 The mutual information turned out to be exactly zero, see Appendix B.
and each link has either no delay or unit delay. We assume the linear network coding [15] , and a link carries single F q symbol per time slot. The linear combination coefficients at each node are fixed so that every legitimate receiver can receive n symbols per time slot from the source. Linear combination coefficients at a node are allowed to change at each time slot except in Section III-C. We shall only consider the eavesdropper Eve and forget about the legitimate receivers. We shall propose a coding method encoding information over m time slots at the source node. Therefore, the source node transmit (m × n) F q symbols in a single coding block. Eve can eavesdrop µ links per time slot. We assume µ ≤ n throughout this paper. The total number of eavesdropped links is therefore mµ.
B. Two-universal hash functions
We shall use a family of two-universal hash functions [6] for the privacy amplification theorem introduced later.
Definition 1: Let F be a set of functions from a finite set S 1 to another finite set S 2 , and F the uniform random variable on F . If for any x 1 x 2 ∈ S 1 we have
then F is said to be a family of two-universal hash functions.
III. Construction of secure multiplex network coding
A. Strengthened privacy amplification theorem
In order to evaluate the mutual information to Eve when the rate of secret information is large, we need to strengthen the privacy amplification theorem originally appeared in [2] , [12] as follows. The original version of the privacy amplification theorems [2] , [12] cannot deduce Eq. (11) while Theorem 2 can.
Theorem 2: Let X and Z be discrete random variables on finite sets X and Z, respectively, and F be a family of twouniversal hash functions from X to S. Let F be the uniform random variable on F statistically independent of X and Z. Then we have
for all 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, where I denotes the (conditional) mutual information as defined in [7] . We use the natural logarithm for all the logarithms in this paper, which include ones implicitly appearing in entropy and mutual information. Otherwise we have to adjust the above inequality. Proof will be given in Appendix A.
B. Description of the proposed scheme
We assume that we have T statistically independent and uniformly distributed secret messages, and that the i-th secret message is given as a random variable S i whose realization is a column vector in F k i q . The sizes k i are determined later. We shall also use a supplementary random message S T +1 taking values in F k T +1 q when the randomness in the encoder is insufficient to make S i secret from Eve. We assume mn =
q to itself, and α I be the projection from
In [17] we have shown that the family {α I • L | L ∈ L} is that of twouniversal hash functions for all ∅ I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. Let L be the uniform random variable on L statistically independent of S 1 , . . . , S T +1 , and arbitrary fix nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. Define X to be the random variable L −1 (S 1 , . . . , S T , S T +1 ). The source node sends X to its n outgoing links over m time slots. Our construction just attaches the inverse of a bijective linear function to an existing network coding.
By the assumption on Eve, her information can be expressed as BX by using a µm × mn matrix B over F q . We regard B as a random variable (matrix) and its probability distribution is denoted by P B . We make no assumption on P B except that the rank of B is at most µm and that B is independent of S 1 , . . . , S T +1 , L and X, which means that Eve does not change B by watching the realization of L. When the random network coding is used and Eve can choose locations of up to µ eavesdropping links but cannot choose the linear coefficients of random network coding, the statistical independence assumption on B looks reasonable. From the uniformity assumption on S i , the conditional distribution P X|L is uniform with every realization of L. This means that X and L are statistically independent and P X is uniform. For fixed z, the set {x ∈ F mn q | Bx = z} has q mn−rankB vectors. Thus, the conditional distribution P X|BX,L,B (x|z, ℓ, b) is the uniform distribution on the set of q mn−rankb elements with every triple of z, ℓ and b. We have
Arbitrary fix nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }, denote the collection of random variables (S i : i ∈ I) by S I , also fix a realization b of B, and let k I = i∈I k i . Under these notations, we can upper bound the mutual information I(S I ; bX|L) as
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. One can also see that
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Averaging Eqs. (3)-(6) over b we have
. Equation (7) and the Markov inequality yield that PrL I,1 < 1/C 1 for any single nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }, where
This means that a realization ℓ of L satisfies
for all the (2 T − 1) nonempty subsets I of {1, . . . , T } with probability at least 1 − (2
Therefore, a realization ℓ of L satisfies both Eq. (9) and
with probability at least 1 − 2 × (2 T − 1)/C 1 . Equation (10) implies
for k I /m − (n − µ) ≥ 0, where in Eq. (11) we used log(1 + exp(x)) ≤ 1 + x for x ≥ 0. Note that Eq. (9) is minimized at ρ = 1, because its partial derivative with respect to ρ is
which is negative for all 0 < ρ ≤ 1. By the same reason Eq. (11) is also minimized at ρ = 1. Fix C 2 with C 2 > 2 × (2 T − 1). By the same argument as above, we see that for a realization ℓ of L satisfying both Eqs. (9) and (11), with probability at least
a realization b of B makes
Even when we choose large C 2 and C 1 and make the probability of b and ℓ satisfying Eqs. (13) and (14) large, we can make the upper bound (13) arbitrary small by increasing m. This observation enables us to use a fixed bijective linear function ℓ that is agreed between the legitimate sender and the receivers in advance. The legitimate receiver can apply the agreed ℓ to the received information in order to restore the original messages S i .
One can easily see that if ρ = 1 and k I ≤ m(n − µ − δ I ) with δ I > 0, then the upper bound (13) on the mutual information exponentially converges to zero as m → ∞. This means that we can transmit (n − µ) F q -symbols in the i-th secret message per time slot with arbitrary small eavesdropped information when the encoding is allowed to be done over sufficiently many time slots. On the other hand, if m(n − µ) ≤ k I ≤ m(R I − δ I ) with δ I > 0 and R I > 0, then by the upper bound (14) we see the mutual information per symbol is upper bounded by
for sufficiently large m. In Section III-D we shall show that the proposed scheme is asymptotically optimal by capacity consideration.
Remark 3:
The meanings of C 1 and C 2 are as follows: At Eqs. (7) and (8), there might not exist a realization ℓ of L that satisfies Eqs. (7) and (8) for all subsets I of {1, . . . , T } simultaneously. By sacrificing the tightness of the upper bounds, we ensure the existence of ℓ satisfying Eqs. (9) and (10). At Eqs. (9) and (10), realizations b of B might satisfy Eqs. (9) and (10) with unacceptably low probability. Again by sacrificing the tightness of the upper bounds, we ensure that the eavesdropping matrix B satisfies Eqs. (13) and (14) with comfortably high probability.
C. Security analysis of the proposed scheme under the traditional eavesdropping model
In the preceding study of secure network coding [4] , [5] , [11] , [19] , [20] , it is assumed that
• the eavesdropper Eve can choose µ eavesdropped links per unit time after learning the structure of network coding, and • the set of eavesdropped links is constant during transmission of one coding block. In Section I we called the above assumption as the traditional eavesdropping model. Under the above assumption, the number of possible sets of eavesdropped links is constant, say C E , independent of m. If we take the random variable B according to the uniform distribution on the sets of eavesdropped links and the probability of some event of B is larger than 1 − 1/C E then that probability must be one. Set C 2 in Eq. (12) 
we can see that Eqs. (13) and (14) hold with every realization of B. In addition to this, the proposed construction of coding does not depend on the network topology nor coding at intermediate nodes.
In that sense, the proposed scheme is universal secure [19] , [20] except that the proposed scheme can make the mutual information arbitrary small 2 , while [19] , [20] make the mutual information exactly zero.
D. Capacity consideration of the proposed scheme
Firstly, let us define the achievable rate tuple and the capacity region as in [7] .
Definition 4: Suppose that we are given a sequence of µm × mn random matrices B m whose distribution P B m has no restriction except that the rank of B m is always µm and that B m is independent of any other random variables. Let e m be a stochastic encoder from 
By Eq. (16) 
For every m, define a m to be an µm × µm matrix and c m to be an mn × mn matrix such that a m b m c m is a matrix of the horizontal concatenation of the µm × µm identity matrix and the zero matrix. By Eq. (17) 
Define X where H denotes the (conditional) entropy as defined in [7] . By abuse of notation, re-define α I to be the projection from 
By Eqs. (15), (16) and (19) (S 1,m , . . . , S T,m ))] ≥ δ/(δ + i∈I R i ) > 0. This shows that the limit of mutual information I (S I,m ; B m e m (S 1,m , . . . , S T,m )|B m )/n cannot be lower than i∈I R i − (n − µ) while keeping the sum of information rates i∈I κ i strictly larger than i∈I R i .
IV. Conclusion
In the secure network coding, there was loss of information rate due to inclusion of random bits at the source node. In this paper, we have shown that a method to eliminate that loss of information rate by using multiple statistically independent messages to be kept secret from an eavesdropper, and called the proposed scheme secure multiplex network coding. The proposed scheme is an adaptation of Yamamoto et al.'s secure multiplex coding [14] to the secure network coding [4] , [5] , [20] .
Proof of Lemma 6. Fix z ∈ Z. The concavity of x ρ for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 implies
Since f is chosen from a family of two-universal hash functions defined in Definition 1, we have
Since any two positive numbers x and y satisfy (x+y)
By Eqs. (21) and (22) we can see
Taking the average over Z of the both sides of the last equation, we have
Define g(ρ) = E XZ P f (X)|Z ( f (X)|Z) ρ as a function of ρ with fixed f and P XZ , and h(ρ) = log g(ρ). We have
Define (X ′ , Z ′ ) to be the random variables that have the same joint distribution as (X, Z) and statistically independent of X and Z. To examine the sign of h ′′ (ρ) we compute
This means that h ′′ (ρ) ≥ 0 and h(ρ) is convex. We can see (25) The first term H(S I |B = b, L = ℓ) is an integer multiple of log q since S I is assumed to have the uniform distribution. For fixed b and ℓ, we have bX = bℓ −1 (S 1 , . . . , S T +1 ). For a given realization bx of bX, the set of solutions s such that bx = bℓ −1 s is written as ker(bℓ −1 )+ some vector v. This means that the set of possible candidates of S I given realization bx of bX is written as α I (ker(bℓ −1 )) + α I (v), and S I given realization bx is uniformly distributed on α I (ker(bℓ −1 )) + α I (v). Since the cardinality of α I (ker(bℓ −1 )) + α I (v) is independent of X for fixed b and ℓ, the second term H(S I |bX, L = ℓ) is also an integer multiple of log q. Therefore, if Eq. (13) holds for every B as verified in Section III-C and the RHS of Eq. (13) is < log q, then the LHS of Eq. (13) must be zero.
In Section I we overlooked the relevant research result by Cai ("Valuable messages and random outputs of channels in linear network coding," Proc. ISIT 2009, Seoul, Korea, Jun. 2009, pp. 413-417). Cai proved that random linear network coding gives the strongly secure network coding in the sense of [11] with arbitrarily high probability with sufficiently large finite fields. The advantages of the present result over Cai's result are (1) we do not have to change encoding at intermediate nodes, (2) our construction is universal secure in the sense of [19] , [20] , and (3) much smaller finite fields can be used than Cai's result.
